Maritime Engineering Journal

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Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia — A MARE’s Report

Also:

- Target Motion Analysis
- Looking Back at HMS Captain
Diving tender replacements are on the horizon — see page 25
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OUR COVER
A European Community Monitoring Mission vehicle shares the road in the Krajina region of Yugoslavia. (Photo by LCdr Bryan Leask)

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Editor’s Notes

Fertile ground — the 1993 regional maritime engineering seminars

By Capt(N) D.W. Riis, OMM, CD
Director of Marine and Electrical Engineering

Together, this year’s three regional maritime engineering seminars covered everything from MARE involvement in naval peacekeeping operations to photogrammetry for shipbuilding and ship repair. Even though, as Commodore Robert L. Preston, DGMEM, pointed out, the seminars were individually developed to satisfy the particular needs of a region, two major undercurrents of discussion emerged across the country — the new fleet, and fiscal restraint.

The challenges of introducing and supporting the CPF and TRUMP ships in light of today’s fiscal reality are not small. In his address to the Central Region seminar in February, Rear-Admiral M.T. Saker, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Engineering and Maintenance, delivered a strong message on fine-tuning the organizational structure to manage the challenges. “We cannot simply peel another layer off the onion as we did in the functional review and expect work to carry on as usual,” he said. “We need to examine whether we need all the functional organizations we currently possess, or whether today’s technologies allow us to do our business differently and better.”

Commodore David Faulkner, Chief of Staff for Materiel in Maritime Command, continued this theme a month later at the Eastern Region seminar when he said, “it comes down to introducing a business-like management approach across the breadth and depth of the naval engineering and maintenance process. We are, after all, running the biggest and most complex ship engineering, modification, maintenance and repair industry in the country.”

On the West Coast in April, CPF Project Manager Commodore Wayne Gibson (speaking on the Branch Adviser’s behalf) expressed the situation this way: “The one constant we can expect in this decade is change,” he said. “We must adapt to change to ensure the maximum operational capability and effectiveness.”

He ended on a bright note concerning the future. “You will have so much opportunity you won’t know what to do with it,” he said.

No maritime engineering seminar would be complete without its guest and keynote speakers. Always a highlight, they are selected from various engineering-related occupations, both within the navy and without, and usually bring with them a fresh perspective on current issues of importance to us. Here is just a taste of what some of them had to offer audiences at the 1993 seminars:

In Ottawa, Canadian Maritime Industries Association President, J.Y. Clarke delivered an impassioned, rational discourse on the industry’s need for work — steady work. He painted a grim picture of an industry operating far below its potential, and pulled no punches as he outlined the CMIA’s strategies for rejuvenating Canada’s marine industrial base. Among the CMIA’s initiatives, a call for an inter-departmental government planning committee to develop a medium-to-long-term vessel procurement strategy for the navy and coast guard. “This is by far the most technically beneficial and economical way of acquiring a number of same-class vessels,” Clarke said. “Let me tell you that three submarines in 15 years doesn’t quite qualify!”

The pace was just as lively in Halifax as Captain(N) (Ret.) Bruce Baxter presented a unique perspective on the challenges that lie ahead for both industry and the navy. Now vice-president of naval programs with Paramax Electronics Ltd., the former DMEE struck a perfect chord with his insights based on his naval and private sector experience. “Technology is not going to be your problem,” Baxter said. “There is probably, today, more technology than you can use in the next 10 to 15 years. The challenge is picking what you want and managing it. We have to plan what we do, and do what we plan.”

As if to underscore the validity of Baxter’s argument, Dr. William Tolles of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC gave the Halifax audience a fascinating overview of the vast area of emerging defence technology — everything from nanotechnology to space-based operational monitoring of environmental conditions around a naval task group. And just so things didn’t get too fancy, Tolles announced the return of...wait for it...vacuum technology.

Kootenay’s commanding officer, Cdr D.J. Kyle, got Day 2 of the West Coast seminar off to a great start with his crowd-pleasing view of the CO-MSEO/CSEO relationship. “COs have been trained to ask only two questions,” he quipped. “What’s broken, and how long is it going to take to fix it?” His checklist of what he expects of his engineering department heads was nicely balanced by his thoughts on what a CO can and should do for the HOD. Brutally frank at times, Kyle questioned the effectiveness of MAREs who have too little sea experience to understand the problems associated with shipboard engineering and technology. As a case in point he described the bridge VDS lost-body indicator as a technically elegant, but useless, piece of kit. “What we really need,” he said, “is a boxing glove that shoots out of the bulkhead and hits you in the face when you’re about to lose your VDS body!”

Commodore Faulkner put it well when he told the Eastern Region audience: “The seminar...is an opportunity both for
Letters to the Editor

MARE duality

LCdr Adams is to be commended for his thoughtful article “The Duality of MARE” (Maritime Engineering Journal, October 1992). It is, I suggest, indicative of the intellectual health of any profession that its members are prepared to question, and to debate, its ethical foundations.

I daresay that most of us at one time or another have wrestled with the notion of duality. Most recently, I have come to believe that this duality is in fact a myth. Moreover, I submit that in propagating the notion of its existence, and particularly of its uniqueness to the MARE MOC, we demonstrate a continuing lack of confidence in our contribution to, and our equal membership in, the Naval Operations branch.

The concept of duality as we have argued it over the years implies an incompatibility between the codes of ethics governing the professional behaviour of naval officers and professional engineers. An examination of these codes reveals, however, that they are based in identical values.

This is not meant to suggest that a MARE will never be confronted with difficult technical decisions. Such decisions do not originate in any conflict of ethics, but rather in the conflict between physical law — or, more often than not, our interpretation of physical law — and operational requirements. Our obligation to the operational commander is to recognize and resolve such conflict before ship-system integrity has been violated or personnel safety jeopardized.

The potential for such conflict has always, and will always, exist. Equally, individuals may, as a consequence of such conflict, confront moral dilemma. The dilemma arises not because of a conflict between codes of ethics, but rather because an individual may find it increasingly difficult to rationalize his professional behaviour within the system of values that is the foundation of the codes.

It is, I submit, presumptuous of us to think that we are unique in this regard. All professionals — such as doctors, civil engineers, accountants, our MARS colleagues — face equally the need to rationalize their professional behaviour within the same system of values.

If we can accept that there is no duality, then we can accept that we have but one profession; that is, that we are naval officers. We are equal partners in the Naval Operations branch and enjoy the right — and incur equal obligation — to exercise naval leadership. While it is important that we maintain a unique identity within the branch, that identity is based not on being “engineers second,” but on a background that permits an objective application of physical law in the safe design, operation, maintenance and repair of ships and their systems.

While I do not deny the importance of adequate sea time — recognizing that “adequate” will vary depending on the needs of the MS, CS, NC or NA sub-MOCs — in the development of this essential background, our professional credibility is based in much more than this single factor. Indeed, as individuals, more important is our ability to live within the values that underpin our code of ethics. As MAREs, more important is our leadership of the naval technical community.

Nevertheless, some positions are better filled by individuals with more rather than less sea experience. But then, the requirements of any position can be defined uniquely. Accepting that individuals continue to grow throughout their careers, common sense suggests that we attempt to match people and positions to satisfy both immediate and long-term service needs, and to satisfy individual aspirations. Our principal currency in making any individual assessment, however, must continue to be merit.

(Cont'd p. 4)
Commodore’s Corner

By Commodore Robert L. Preston

In the last Commodore’s Corner I talked about the introduction of our new ships and the importance of this modern equipment to our navy. Since the last issue of the *Maritime Engineering Journal*, a number of successful trials have been conducted by ships of both the CPF and Tribal classes. The introduction of an area air-defence capability was proven when HMCS Algonquin successfully fired two Standard Missiles at targets on the U.S. missile range in the Puerto Rico area. This capability marks an important step in the evolution of the Canadian navy as we put into service an enhanced capability to command and protect a Canadian task group.

The last time that the Canadian navy introduced modern capability in a class of warships was in the early 1970s when the Tribal-class destroyers entered service. In that I was actively involved as Marine Systems Engineering Officer in HMCS Athabaskan. I thought it appropriate that I devote this Commodore’s Corner to one of the “lessons learned” from that era.

There was a tendency prevalent in the navy at that time to look at the negative side of the introduction of that new capability. There was technology that not everyone understood, there were insufficient spare parts, not everything worked exactly as we wanted. That tendency had the effect of diverting attention from the improved capability that was being introduced. I hope that the same tendency does not exist among engineers today.

The most significant lesson that emerged from the early 1970s had to do with the time it took to identify deficiencies in the Tribal class, engineer solutions to these problems and implement the solutions in a timely fashion. If there is an area to which we MARE officers must turn our attention, this is it. A co-ordinated and deliberate approach will be necessary to identify and prioritize the few remaining technical issues in our new ship classes so that corrections can be engineered, developed and implemented to allow the full capability of these exciting new platforms to be realized.

I know that MARE officers will be up to this challenge.

(Letters cont’d)

While I accept as opinion the suggestion that MARE training is driving us relentlessly toward “engineering.” I could not recommend that we yet accept this as fact. That sea time has been — and may further be — reduced is a fact. Whether or not adequate sea time has been built into the training program, however, can only be determined by objective validation. As such validation is realized, I ask only that we not lose sight of the substantive contribution made by all naval engineers, at sea and ashore, in delivering to the operational commander the capability that will allow him to defeat today’s threat. This is the same professional engineering strength that will allow us to maintain and upgrade this capability to meet tomorrow’s threat.

If we perceive the linkage between the MARE and the navy to be weaker now than in the past, then perhaps it is time that we set aside the notion of duality and accepted that we have but one profession. — Cmdre D.G. Faulkner, Chief of Staff Materiel, Maritime Command Headquarters, Halifax.
Assistant Head of Department:
Should a job be an OSQ?

By Lt(N) C.G. Pitre

“The assistant HOD position on board a ship is a job and not a training billet!” A familiar phrase in the MARE community. Just the fact that we must constantly remind ourselves of this clearly indicates there is a problem understanding the role of the assistant within the department. Let’s examine why it seems a bit unrealistic to affirm that it is not a training position, why we underestimate our abilities and how the system could produce the same results without an occupation specialty qualification (OSQ).

“Sub-MOC qualified officers have the tools they need to succeed as assistants. There is no need to make the A/HOD position an OSQ.”

The role of the assistant as described in Ship Standing Orders (SSOs) is unclear. In the organization chart the position is derived from the HOD, connected by a dotted line and essentially not having any impact on the department. It also states that in the absence of the department head the chief shall assume responsibility for the department. Under the roles and responsibilities of the assistant, SSOs state that the A/HOD will assist the department head and be given tasks that provide progressively challenging development. Thus, a series of performance objectives must be completed to ensure a standard, and a Phase 7 HOD board convened to confirm the level of expertise. Technically, an assistant cannot take responsibility for a department until the OSQ has been completed. All these factors contribute to the doubtfullness of that position being a job and not training.

Should A/HOD be an OSQ? First let’s take a look at a typical sub-MOC qualified lieutenant’s posting such as CSEO/MSEO at the TRUMP detachment in Lauzon, Quebec. The responsibilities associated with these positions include being in charge of a division of at least four P1s and above, approving jobs of up to $70,000 each on ships, writing contractual technical letters, dealing directly with contractors and indirectly with unions, etc. Why do we allow newly sub-MOC qualified lieutenants to take on responsibilities ashore that sometimes exceed those of a department head in a ship, yet demand an OSQ for the job at sea? Is it fair to ask these same people to return to sea only to have a chief take over the department in the absence of the HOD because the lieutenants are supposedly not qualified?

I consider that an assistant has the same background as a head of department, but less experience. A learning process is inherent to every new job and sub-MOC qualified officers do have the tools they need to succeed as assistants. There is no need to make the position an OSQ. Department heads could be held accountable for ensuring that standardized A/HOD developmental objectives are met during an assistant’s time on board ship. For that matter, certain of the existing performance objectives could be integrated with Phase 6 sub-MOC training as essential HOD validation criteria. Either way, specific roles could be assigned to standardize the job of the A/HOD position which would then appear at the same level as the deputy in the org chart. Finally, what better way to determine the ability of a candidate to return to sea than through the evaluation means of the PER.

The OSQ process makes the position of assistant head of department in a ship a fine line between a job and training.
DGMEM on A/HOD Employment

By Commodore Robert L. Preston

At the East Coast MARE seminar in March, the A/CSEO in HMCS Ville de Quebec raised a question concerning the duties and responsibilities of the assistant head of department in a ship. My response to her at the time included a commitment from me to look into the issue. In the interim, Lt(N) Pitre submitted her question to the Journal. I want to take this opportunity to say a few words on the issue of responsibility and qualifications in general and then outline the future of A/HOD employment.

The issue of qualification is fundamental to the practice of engineering, not only in the navy but universally. To this end we support an extensive certification program for our engineering officers and technical tradespersons. The final part of this qualification process for officers is employment as an A/HOD in a ship. This job has the elements of both employment and training and to attempt to categorize it as one or the other underestimates its importance and complexity. The knowledge one is able to consolidate while working as an A/HOD is a fundamental ingredient in the ability of the certification process to state unequivocally that an officer is competent to execute the technical and management responsibilities of an engineering head of department at sea. We must remember that we are not training for peacetime operations — the head of department must be able to lead the operation and maintenance effort under the most demanding conditions of combat. That is a dimension which is quite different from even the most technically difficult shore posting.

That is not to say that the issue of A/HOD employment should not be reviewed to ensure that it meets current requirements. As was announced at the MARE seminars this past spring, the MARE occupation will undergo an occupational analysis (OA) in the next year. I have already passed a number of our concerns, including the question of A/HOD employment in a ship, on to the OA staff of ADM(Per) as action items for the analysis. Each of you will be invited to respond to a questionnaire that the OA team (which includes two MARE officers) will administer to the occupation at large in the Jan./Feb. '94 time frame. I invite you to be frank and open in your responses. As the information you provide will form the basis of the conclusions drawn, it is critical to the success of the OA that your answers be as honest and forthright as possible. Once this process has been completed I will inform you of its outcome, particularly with respect to the issue of A/HOD employment.

Be assured that I appreciate Lt(N) Pitre’s initiative in raising this very pertinent question. Through the OA we will do our utmost to respond to it objectively, taking into account the interests of the navy, the engineering branch and individual MARE officers.
Join the navy and see the world! That was the popular sign-on slogan when I joined the navy in the mid-60s, and over the years I have logged thousands of nautical miles and visited many countries bordering the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In early 1992, during my fourth year behind a desk in Maritime Command headquarters, the desire to travel got in my blood again and I volunteered for peacekeeping duties. My opportunity to break the tether to the desk came in March 1992 in the form of a four-month tour with the European Community Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia (ECMMY); Canadian code name — Operation Bolster.

The basis for the mission lies in a 1991 memorandum of understanding signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the separate republics of the federation and the 12-member European Community. The initial agreement signed in July of that year mandated the ECMMY to monitor the deactivation and withdrawal of Yugoslav national army forces from Slovenia. On Sept. 1 the agreement was renewed and extended again a month later to include Bosnia-Hercegovina.

At the request of the conflicting parties Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Canada were invited to participate in the mission alongside the European Community. Altogether the mission comprises approximately 330 unarmed military, civilian and diplomatic personnel, including 12 members of the Canadian Forces. Only Luxembourg does not have personnel involved in the mission.
The Canadian ECMMY rotation team I was assigned to assembled in Ottawa for briefings on May 4, 1992. The team was composed of six officers, two each from the navy, army and air force. (A seventh member, an army officer, would join us later in Lahr.) The seriousness of our undertaking hit home early when our departure for Europe was delayed for two weeks after a Belgian monitor was shot in Mostar, Bosnia-Hercegovina. We eventually arrived in Lahr to complete a final kitting-out on May 21 before making our way to Graz, Austria — our jumping-off point for Yugoslavia. Since Croatian air space was not safe, we travelled for two hours by road through Slovenia to reach the ECMMY headquarters in Zagreb where all mission personnel report.

As monitors we would be arranging and taking part in negotiations between the opposing parties, monitoring handovers of civilians and bodies, monitoring prisoner-of-war exchanges and ceasefires, and attending to humanitarian affairs. One important point we had to remember was that monitors must remain impartial at all times. To that end, all ECMMY personnel wore plain naval white uniforms (i.e. without rank or country insignia) with blue EC armbands and baseball caps, and addressed each other as "Mister" or "Ms."

The air of war was obvious as we walked the streets of Zagreb — damaged buildings, sandbags for protection, and armed soldiers everywhere. We weren't there for long. Before leaving Canada each of us had been assigned to one of the ECMMY regional centres located in Zagreb, Split, Belgrade and Sarajevo (temporarily relocated in Zagreb until such time as it was deemed safe for teams to return to the Bosnian capital.) Two of us journeyed on to the port of Rijeka where all mission personnel report.

We spent the first week delivering mail and medical supplies to the war-weary Croatian population consisted mainly of elderly persons who had been left behind to watch over the family homes and property.

From then on our basic routine was to travel afield for one or two weeks, return to Split to resupply and head out again. The work was not without its hazards, and at times our patrols were limited by the danger from snipers, artillery and mines. (Mines had already been responsible for the death of two French officers and injuries to a Canadian UN team.)

On the first mission away we had to cross the front twice to reach the village of Nos Kalik, which had been overrun by the Territorial Defence Force of the Krajina (TDF) and later retaken by the Croatian Army. Our ECMMY team was there to ensure the safety of 19 Serbian villagers whose lives were virtually controlled by the Croatian soldiers. There was a lot of tension in the village as most of the soldiers had recently seen their own homes being burned in the nearby town of Drnis, now under TDF control. They were understandably less than enthusiastic about having to look after a bunch of Serbian villagers. During our five-day stay we lived with a Serbian couple (assigned to us by the Croatian Army). The Croatian Army supplied the village with food every day, which was delivered by boat and brought up from the shore by donkey at 2 p.m.

The Krajina

During one 13-day mission the team went out to the headquarters of the Krajina authorities in Knin to monitor the military and conduct humanitarian visits. We spent the first week delivering mail and medical supplies to the war-weary Croatian and Serbian villagers. The Croatian population consisted mainly of elderly persons who had been left behind to watch over the family homes and property.

Each day was eventful. Like the time a report came in concerning the plight of 2,500 Muslims attempting to escape Bosnia and enter Croatia at Van Kaluf. Although our orders were not to enter Bosnia, we discussed the situation with the French UN battalion commander and investigated the area under the protection...
Dubrovnik

Dubrovnik was a combat zone, and just getting into this port city on the Adriatic 150 kilometres south of Split was interesting in itself. Accompanied by a police and military escort we left the main highway 20 kilometres north of the city to avoid TDF snipers who were known to be operating along the highway into Dubrovnik. (An ECMMY vehicle from an earlier mission had already been hit by sniper fire along this route. Fortunately, no one was injured.) We completed our journey to Dubrovnik by ferry. The city was under fairly constant shelling from the Yugoslav Army to the south and the Bosnian Serbs to the east, so our work for the next two weeks was somewhat limited.

One of the interesting tasks involved witnessing a humanitarian-aid mission to Cavtat, a Croatian town under Yugoslav Army control 15 kilometres south of Dubrovnik. Damage from mortar and artillery attacks had left the main road impassable, so the M/V Astral was chartered under the Red Cross, UN and EC flags to transport food to the town and carry back 20 Croatian Army POWs being released to the International Red Cross. It was a beautiful day, with the odd greeny coming over the bow — just what a sailor loves. The transfer of goods and POWs went without a hitch, but the propaganda machine still found something to chew on. During our return journey the POWs, ecstatic at being free, had tossed much of their captor-issued clothing into the sea. The press made the most of it after we docked in Dubrovnik, declaring: “Barefoot soldiers released.”

Although the team’s safety was always in jeopardy in Dubrovnik (several shells landed within 75 metres of our hotel) we did get a chance to walk around the old city. To the residents’ credit, they never seemed to give up on clearing away rubble and effecting temporary repairs from shell damage. One family even invited us into their home, but it was sad to see from the attitude of the children that another generation of hatred was being bred.

We did have one particularly rewarding experience when we met with officials in Sibenik to see about rebuilding the water supply to Drnis in the Krajina. The Croats were hesitant, but we managed to convince them it was to their advantage and would meet one of the requirements of the U.S.-brokered Vance Plan for returning refugees to their homes. The conflicting authorities eventually engaged in high-level meetings on the subject of the water supply.

Going Home

The war was causing a lot of grief to people from all sides. We soon discovered that it was a common occurrence for families to be torn apart because of intermarriage and allegiance to ancestry. One Serbian family’s experience was typical. Of the three children, the son was doing fine with a well-to-do Serbian family, but the situation for the two girls placed together in another home was deteriorating. The girls, aged one and two, were being looked after by a caring family, but the foster father had lost his job as a salesman in Zadar and ended up as a poorly paid private soldier in the TDF. It was a sad situation, but we had no choice other than to recommend the girls be returned to the orphanage in Zadar.

My final 18 days with the mission were spent in the Krajina, delivering mail and medicine, and checking up on people. It was simple until the Drnis authorities decided to open all mail for inspection prior to delivery. This sometimes called for delicate negotiations, but at other times we just ignored them and hoped for the best. They never did open the mail.

Probably our grimmest task involved witnessing the exhumation of 23 TDF soldiers killed two months earlier during
The two-masted M/V Astral, under charter by the Red Cross, the United Nations and the European Community, waits alongside the pier in Cavtat, Croatia for delivery of a group of POWs.

From Split were flown to Zagreb by ECMMY helicopter, a four-hour flight. After two days of turnover briefings for the next rotation team (LCdr James Guilford of FMGA was the MARE relief) we headed for Lahr, returning to Canada on Sept. 10.

Postscript

Would I do it again? Yes! Working with a multinational organization in another country under trying conditions was an enlightening and rewarding experience.

Am I married or still married? Yes! I was fortunate in that I had the support of my family before volunteering. My wife, Heather, well used to long periods of separation, was and continues to be very supportive on the home front. Our two daughters are both in their late teens and present no out-of-the-ordinary problems that she cannot handle. Midway through my tour I returned to Canada for a much-welcomed week of leave that is granted to all members of the Canadian ECMMY rotation team. This was certainly another positive aspect of my experience, but anyone considering volunteering for this type of mission should recognize the physical risks and weigh these against family situation and career aspirations.

LCdr Bryan Leask is the Senior Staff Officer for Engineering Plans and Policy in Maritime Command Headquarters. At the request of MARCOMHQ he returned to Eastern Europe (Albania, this time) at the end of February to relieve LCdr Guilford, there being no other MARE lieutenant-commander available from the MARCOM volunteer list.
Target Evaluation and Weapon Assignment — A Generic Model

By Jean Berger

I. Basic Concepts

Naval TEWA analysis

This paper constitutes a condensed summary — A Generic Model can be identified:

component are then hierarchically examined. This paper constitutes a condensed summary of a work performed at DREV on naval TEWA analysis.

II. High-Level Defence Model

A defence model is proposed as a framework to define TEWA. Based on a sense-act loop representation (Fig. 1), the model is made up of three elements: environment, system, and context. The context denotes the set of specific conditions and assumptions (e.g., political climate, location, etc.) within which the system and the environment exist.

The first block represents the combat environment, which includes a set of various entities surrounding a task force or single ship. The environment generates periodic and aperiodic stimuli such as evolving threats, incoming information for the force and changing meteorological conditions. The second block delineates the situation assessment module and the resource allocation (SARA) C2 processing stages. In effect, target evaluation is only a partial aspect of the situation assessment whereas weapon assignment is a specific instance of resource allocation. For present purposes, however, the terms TEWA and SARA will be used interchangeably.

III. TEWA Model

This section presents the basic subfunctions describing the TEWA function applied to naval command and control. In the literal sense, TEWA is a subset of the situation assessment and resource allocation (SARA) C2 processing stages. In effect, target evaluation is only a particular aspect of situation assessment whereas weapon assignment is a specific instance of resource allocation. For present purposes, however, the terms TEWA and SARA will be used interchangeably.

The high-level plan generated by TEWA is sent to the action manager. Directed by a battle strategic planner (TEWA subunit), the action manager is responsible for lower-level plan expansion, engagement management and control. The action manager transmits orders to subordinated agents and reports to TEWA on any unexpected changes as the situation unfolds. Plan execution is the responsibility of an agent, whose components include sensors, effectors, reflexes and a cognitive function (mental task planning, monitoring actions, etc.). Weapon operators and weapon computers might therefore be considered agents due to their control over weapons and fire-support resources. Effectors associated with physical elements or devices such as interceptors and/or illuminators are used to modify the variables of the environment.

Resource Allocation refers to the determination of options and the selection of direct actions as a result of the situation assessment. Resource allocation has to do with reaction generation, conflict resolution and reaction selection based on the analysis of the current situation.

The high-level plan generated by TEWA is sent to the action manager. Directed by a battle strategic planner (TEWA subunit), the action manager is responsible for lower-level plan expansion, engagement management and control. The action manager transmits orders to subordinated agents and reports to TEWA on any unexpected changes as the situation unfolds. Plan execution is the responsibility of an agent, whose components include sensors, effectors, reflexes and a cognitive function (mental task planning, monitoring actions, etc.). Weapon operators and weapon computers might therefore be considered agents due to their control over weapons and fire-support resources. Effectors associated with physical elements or devices such as interceptors and/or illuminators are used to modify the variables of the environment.

IV. TEWA and SARA

The subfunctions to be considered are threat assessment, defence assessment and plan monitoring/assessment. The input consists of a complete list of tracks describing target kinematic parameters,
identification information, source and quality of data. The output is a weighted threat list to be processed by the resource allocation module.

The threat assessment function generates a weighted list of threats to be processed by the resource allocation module. It comprises three functional sublevels: identification, threat evaluation and threat prioritization.

a. Identification: The goal of this subfunction is to gain or complement information on target category (allegiance), type and identification. The input is a list of target tracks, ESM sensor data, IFF transponder response data and intelligence reports. Allegiance assessment, based on specific algorithms and expert knowledges, is first carried out by classifying tracks as hostile, unknown or friendly. Statements regarding type and possible identification are then inferred to supplement the target picture. This knowledge is characterized by confidence factors which depend on uncertainty and incompleteness of the time-varying attributes attached to track data.

b. Threat Evaluation: From hostile tracks or unknown track identities, the threat evaluation subfunction defines track status. It determines if a track constitutes a threat or non-threat based on specific rules. Threat determination depends on mission doctrine, relative weights associated with blue force assets, target dynamics, lethality, identity, track history, target intent, electronic emissions, behaviour, intelligence, etc. The output is a list of tracks which represent threats posed to the force. Once again, confidence factors characterize the output.

c. Prioritization: This subfunction computes and lists weighted values for each threat posed to the force. Threat values are attributed according to a set of rules which depend upon static or dynamic properties attached to the mission doctrine of the force. Threat values rely on threat type and intelligence, current status, behaviour, kinematic parameters, closest point of approach and other threat attributes such as cross-section and IR signature.

The defence assessment subfunction evaluates the effectiveness of the defensive screen in countering hostile intruders moving against the protected zone. The input comprises the force’s resource state, the threat list and the engagements which are ongoing or being implemented. The output is updated information on resource capabilities and abilities to establish an efficient defensive screen.

The objective is to monitor the effectiveness of a defensive screen against various kinds of threats as the tactical situation unfolds. Possible attack scenarios (identified in the threat assessment) are evaluated to identify changes or new opportunities for the force to improve its defensive shield. Some measures of effectiveness related to the use of the force’s resources such as workload level, capacity, tactical state and responsibility, operational status and coverage are provided.

Output from the threat and defence assessments constitutes the input to the plan monitoring and plan assessment subfunction whose goal is to validate plans and identify potential need or opportunity for plan refinement. The function determines whether plans are being followed and, if not, alerts the strategic planner to any discrepancies occurring in a plan’s execution. Plans are validated to determine if commitments made so far are likely to lead to a complete plan given the changing tactical situation.

Resource Allocation

The resource allocation module, known also as the strategic planning unit, is depicted by two subfunctions — plan generation and plan selection. Weapon allocation will be of primary concern. Data from the situation assessment module provides the input. The output is a reaction described as a mission plan and represented by a set of resource allocation plans.

The plan generation subfunction generates a set of feasible solutions through options and reactions, and characterizes them by a measure of effectiveness. The input to this subfunction is the data available from the situation assessment module.

Plan generation is divided into two major parts: reaction feasibility and reaction effectiveness. At first, a set of feasible reactions is determined, based on a combination of previous assessments and engageability calculations. Thereafter, each option or allocation plan generated is
characterized by a measure of effectiveness through a prediction procedure based on different parameters. An allocation plan might typically consist of a combination of resources such as an interceptor (weapon) and fire-support resources (tracker or illuminator) committed to an incoming threat.

From this set of feasible, high-level allocation plans, the **plan selection** subfunction selects an appropriate reaction plan that will achieve the short- or long-term goals set by the force to fulfill its mission. Based upon mission doctrine, the battle strategic planner must determine the best mission plan for achieving the goals. Rules of engagement are used to narrow the search and find a solution. According to multiobjective optimization criteria, such rules attempt to predict the impact of the reaction on the combat environment and achieve optimal resource allocation subject to multiple constraints. Combining numerical and symbolic information, the chosen criteria are part of the doctrine, and their relative weights may change dynamically.

Replanning is required when new information invalidates the previous plan, or when unplanned situations arise during execution. A compromise between speed and optimality is then needed. In addition, situation uncertainty requires a trade-off to be determined between the predictability of the environment in which the plan is to be executed and the degree of reactivity which is necessary to successfully achieve the goals of the plan. Advanced planning, based on open-loop feedback and closed-loop strategies involving opportunistic look-ahead, and replanning represent major challenges for proper resource allocation and therefore constitute two key issues in constructing plans[7].

**Conclusion**

The decision-making process is critical to the success of a naval command and control system. As no theory of C2 is either universally or even generally well accepted, some problems arise in the design of a decision-making process to be embedded in a large and complex C2 system. There is a need to define and capture TEWA as a distinct process in C2 decision-making.

This paper attempts to provide a consistent and generic conceptual model for the TEWA function. It relies on the basic concepts of situation assessment and resource allocation. An in-house TEWA concept demonstrator (SARA) based on this conceptual model has recently been developed at Defence Research Establishment Valcartier. Following an evolutionary approach, the object-oriented simulation environment is intended to be used to investigate problem models and algorithms for weapon assignment.

**References**


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Naval Engineering — Synergy at Work*

By LCdr M.J. Adams, CD, PEng

Introduction

Canada’s naval engineering team is entrusted with the responsibility of operating, maintaining, analyzing, designing, supporting and, among other things, modifying the ships of the navy. Since it is virtually impossible for one individual to be equally adept at each of these diverse fleet-support activities, several components of differing knowledge and experience are needed. Moreover, because of today’s climate of downsizing and budgetary restraint it is imperative that the naval engineering team be able to maximize its effectiveness.

This paper introduces a possible strategy for increasing the effectiveness of naval engineering in general. It utilizes an upbeat principle of synergy, whereby the combined or co-operative actions of two or more agents together increase each other’s effectiveness, to show how the benefits of Canada’s great wealth of in-house naval engineering knowledge and skill can be maximized.

The Naval Engineering Team

The navy fulfils its engineering responsibilities through four distinct technical components (apart from an administration and support component) within the naval engineering team. Two are military and two are civilian, and each brings with it differing levels of experience and knowledge. These components are:

- naval officers, primarily Maritime Engineers (MAREs);
- civilian scientific and professional personnel, primarily engineers (ENGs);
- naval non-commissioned members (NCMs), primarily those in the “hard-sea” technical trades; and
- civilian technicians (TECHs), primarily of the electronics, engineering and scientific support groups.

At the risk of oversimplifying the range of expertise available to the naval engineering team, the following summation is submitted:

- MAREs offer theoretical knowledge combined with generalized experience. They also offer hands-on knowledge of ship’s systems, and leadership and organizational skills.
- ENGs offer theoretical knowledge combined with specialized experience, in addition to stability and corporate knowledge.
NCMs offer practical knowledge combined with generalized experience. They also offer detailed nuts-and-bolts expertise and the most sea-time of the four categories.

TECHs offer practical knowledge combined with specialized experience, as well as stability and corporate knowledge.

Synergy

Now that the four components of the naval engineering team have been identified, let’s have some fun with synergy.

As mentioned, synergy is commonly defined as “the combined or co-operative actions of two or more agents that together increase each other’s effectiveness.” Since this is a naval engineering theme, the following engineering interpretation of synergy, hereby entitled “Murphy’s Interpretation of Synergy,” is offered.

Let’s start with a real-world definition of what naval engineering is by defining the real world as Murphy’s Domain, using the well-known Murphy’s Law: “Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong —” Now let us add the naval engineering corollary: “— and we will have to fix it!”

Using standard cartesian co-ordinates as shown in Fig. 1, let us define the horizontal axis as experience, ranging from generalized to specialized. And let’s make the vertical axis represent knowledge, ranging from practical to theoretical. Finally, why not make the origin the starting point of an individual’s engineering training.

In looking at these co-ordinates it becomes obvious that the right-hand quadrants can represent professional knowledge levels and the lower quadrants can represent the technical levels. Thus, on a purely simplistic approach, the four components of the naval engineering team can be readily assigned as shown.

Now, using Fig. 2, let us define an Individual Vector as a vector representing an individual’s current knowledge and experience. This vector would continue to grow as each individual gained more experience and knowledge. Let us define a Murphy Point as being a specific occurrence of the naval engineering corollary to Murphy’s Law, i.e. a problem that we have to fix.

Finally, let us define the Wing-it Factor as being the distance between the individual vector and the Murphy point. This factor can represent the probability of error in an individual vector addressing a Murphy point, i.e. the farther the vector is away from the problem, the higher the likelihood the resolution of that problem by that individual will be unsatisfactory.

Now we can define exactly what synergy entails. Simply put, synergy frees up an individual vector’s anchor point from the origin. As shown in Fig. 3, one vector can now use a second vector as its origin (i.e. one vector can move along another), thereby increasing the effective area covered and, at the same time, minimizing the wing-it factor — the probability of error. Of course, this being Murphy’s domain, the wing-it factor can never ever be zero.
Types of Synergy

There are many types of synergy available to naval engineers. The following examples are but a few of the more applicable ones for the naval engineering team:

- **Direct Synergy** (Fig. 4) is the simplest type and was the one used to introduce the overall concept of synergy. It is the pooling of effort and expertise from two individuals (for example, a MARE and an NCM) to address a problem that neither is comfortable attempting on his own.

- **Complementary Synergy** (Fig. 5) uses direct synergy to address problems that the usual problem handler, for whatever reason, is unable to address; for example, combining an ENG and an NCM to address a problem that a MARE away on French training would normally have handled.

- **Cross-pollination Synergy** (Fig. 6) occurs when a member of one component transfers to another (e.g., an NCM retires from the navy and joins the TECH component). Instead of starting at the origin for the new component, the new experience and knowledge gained augments the original individual vector, thereby increasing the expertise of that individual.

- **Enhancement Synergy** (Fig. 7) is scalar in that the magnitude of a vector changes, not the direction. A good example of this is the synergetic relationship between computer hardware, software and "liveware." Hardware and software are basically useless by themselves, but when combined with an experienced operator they can dramatically increase that individual's effectiveness.

- **Cumulative Synergy** (Fig. 8) which uses several individual vectors to address a problem (such as in a teamwork situation). It should be noted that this type of synergy can sometimes exceed the point of diminishing returns.

- **Chaotic Synergy** (Fig. 9), a type of synergy to which committees are particularly prone. Basically, the more vectors that are applied to a problem, the more control is necessary to maintain the overall direction. In other words, with more and more vectors pulling in different directions, the overall progress in solving the problem at hand can be hindered (sometimes irreversibly). Thus, a key requirement of cumulative synergy is a clearly accountable manager who maintains sight of the goal and can optimally assign and monitor the vectors as needed.
Consequences of Large Wing-it Factors

Before we explore how we can apply these principles of synergy to naval engineering, let us reassure ourselves of the need for synergy. It is acknowledged that synergy is not essential for the day-to-day operation of the naval engineering team. Individuals working in isolation can and do achieve individual goals. But as the goals move farther away from an individual’s area of expertise, the wing-it factor, or potential for error, increases. What are some of the potential consequences of large wing-it factors?

- Losses in individual productivity could occur as an individual attempts to learn new skills to address unfamiliar problems. While it can be beneficial for repetitive problems, it is not cost-effective for rarely occurring problems.

- It stands to reason that the tendency to procrastinate is directly proportional to the wing-it factor. In other words, individuals tend to address familiar problems first and let the unfamiliar ones accumulate, thus reducing our ability to meet objectives.

- Large wing-it factors could also promote the “pass the buck” syndrome. The laws of physics state that an object going from one point to another will take the path of least resistance. Given the choice of A: dealing with an unfamiliar problem; or B: sending it back for unnecessary clarification or to someone else entirely, it is likely that the latter would be the overwhelming winner, thus further reducing our capability to serve the fleet.

- A final consequence — potentially the most damaging to system efficiency — is the application of “best-guess” roulette. This game of providing guesstimate answers to problems is played by individuals who are insufficiently familiar with the problem in the first place.

The probability of follow-on corrective action is directly proportional to the wing-it factor. The adage of “a gram of prevention is worth a kilogram of cure” is fully applicable in this situation. History has proven that problems caused by the inappropriate solution of an earlier problem often require corrective measures that are orders of magnitude greater than the correct solution to the original problem.

Now that we have a handle on what synergy is and why we would want it, we can now consider a few suggestions for implementing the principles of synergy in our workplace.

The Application of Synergy

The field of naval engineering is rapidly expanding, with new technologies, new strategies and new priorities. If we don’t address new problems, we become a new problem. The naval engineering team has a diverse wealth of expertise upon which it can draw to support the fleet. Each individual within our organization has a different background, different strengths and weaknesses. Only by becoming aware of these attributes can one gain access to the benefits of synergy. How do we do this?

The recurring theme that stands out in discussions about synergy is that of cooperation. The only way that the individual vectors can shift their base from the origin is by co-operating with another vector. And since the most important element of cooperation is communication, we must communicate with our fellow workers. We can not afford the false luxury of working in isolation.

The catalyst for bridging the gap between the synergy elements and achieving synergy itself is initiative: we cannot wait for others to make the first move. It’s simple. During coffee, lunch or a “sanity break,” saunter over to your neighbour and start up a conversation. Before you know it there will be a two-way exchange of experiences, ideas and stories that will greatly enhance the way that we, as members of the naval engineering team, address new and old problems.

The application of synergy can greatly increase the effectiveness of the naval engineering team, but we must take the initiative to communicate with each other and learn what each other has to offer the matrix. Similarly, we must take the initiative to co-operate and help each other apply our hard-earned knowledge and experience in the best way possible. Working together we can increase the probability of finding the best resolution to the problem, we can make more and better contacts for future use and, who knows, we might even learn something in the process.

Synergy is the way we can increase our effectiveness in battling Murphy’s domain without additional resources. That is how we can meet today’s challenge in supporting tomorrow’s navy.
Introduction

Passive tracking of a moving target is a routine part of modern naval operations. Analyzing a target’s motion to determine its range, course and speed (i.e. the target solution) allows a tracking vessel to first localize the target, then predict its future position. Such target motion analysis (TMA), as it is called, is a necessary precursor to either collision avoidance or tactical action. Up until four or five years ago, operators performing TMA with passive sonar were limited to rough, “bearings only” data upon which they based their target solutions. Today, thanks to advances in passive sonar signal processing and digital computers, frequency data can be combined with bearing information to produce superior results in passive target motion analysis.

As the name implies, the bearings-only tracking method uses only the measured bearings to a target to estimate the target’s range, course and speed. This is the most widely used method of TMA when operating passive sonar such as a towed array. Many approaches have been developed, but each requires the observing platform to change heading at least once for the target parameter solution to converge. (Additional manoeuvres will increase the reliability of the target solution estimate.) In practice, this is not always desirable. The stability and linearity of a towed array are degraded as it travels around the corner of a turn, resulting in loss of effective beamforming capability and, occasionally, loss of contact. A target’s signal might or might not be regained once the array has steadied up on the new course. Furthermore, having to manoeuvre the tracking vessel over a relatively large baseline to determine a target solution imposes unnecessary tactical restrictions and is a significant disadvantage of bearings-only tracking methods.

A relatively new doppler-bearing tracking (DBT) method for passive tracking has been proposed that makes use of not only the measured bearings to the target, but the measured doppler-shifted target tonal frequencies as well. By simultaneously measuring source target bearings and radiated doppler frequencies, the doppler-bearing filter can estimate the target’s position, velocity and source frequencies without having to manoeuvre the tracking ship. The results are usually significantly more accurate than those obtained with the bearings-only filter. The aim of this article is to introduce the reader to doppler-bearing tracking and to demonstrate its superiority over the traditional bearings-only techniques.

Background

Bearings-only TMA originated in the submarine service during the Second World War and is still useful today as a check on automated systems. Called 1936 or Ekelund ranging, manual bearings-only ranging uses a time-bearing plot, with bearings having been measured over at least two legs. As shown in Fig. 1, bearings are manually smoothed and extrapolated to an intersection point corresponding to the instant when the ownship observer is midway through the manoeuvre from leg 1 to leg 2. The relationship between bearing rate (β), range (R) and tangential relative velocity (V_T) is

\[ \beta \cdot R = V_T \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

and can be used to calculate the range at the time of bearing intersection. The relative velocity component tangential to the intersection bearing is taken as the difference between ownship and target tangential velocities. By estimating the bearing rates and ownship tangential velocities for each respective leg, the target range at the instant of intersection can be calculated as

\[ R_t = \frac{V_o - V_a}{\beta_1 - \beta_2} \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where \( V_o \) is the ownship tangential velocity component. This method can provide a rough estimate of target range which in turn can be used to solve for the target’s velocity. As with all bearings-only tracking algorithms, the bearings-only ranging manoeuvre requires that bearings be measured over at least two ownship legs to solve for the target solution.

Automated bearings-only algorithms use the same principle as the manual method to make a best estimate of a target solution given noisy measurements. Sophisticated signal processing techniques such as the Kalman filter and, now, maximum likelihood batch processing, are used in these automated systems. The batch...
The principle behind doppler-bearing tracking is straightforward. The frequency as seen by the observing platform is doppler-shifted as a function of the relative radial velocity between the observer and source target. Bearing measurements then resolve target course and allow for the range to be estimated. A doppler-bearing tracker also provides an estimate of the source frequency (or frequencies), which is of course useful for target classification.

The manual doppler-bearing method provides a useful insight to the doppler-bearing problem and demonstrates how an ownship ranging manoeuvre is not needed for calculating target solution. Doppler-bearing ranging does require that both the observer and the target have constant course and speed, and that the radiated source frequency \( f_0 \) be constant over the tracking period.

As the target is tracked, manual or semi-automated time-doppler and time-bearing plots are maintained. The time-doppler plot is the primary aid for manual doppler-bearing ranging. Once the closest point of approach (CPA) to the target has passed, a “doppler range” may be taken. As Fig. 2 illustrates, the CPA can be identified by an increasing to decreasing transition (or vice versa) in the rate of change of the received frequency. The received frequency \( f_r \) will equal \( f_0 \) when the target is at CPA, as \( \theta \), the angle between radial and relative velocity vectors, is 90 degrees. The measured doppler-shifted frequency, as seen by the observer, is approximated as

\[
f_r = f_0 \left(1 + \frac{V_r}{c} \cos \theta \right)
\]

where \( V_r \) is the relative velocity and \( c \) is the speed of sound in water. Once \( f_r \) is known it is a relatively simple operation to extrapolate backward in time to find the asymptotic frequency where the doppler shift is due to the entire relative velocity component as \( \theta \) approaches zero degrees. At this point

\[
V_r = \frac{c}{T_0} (f_r - f_0)
\]

By taking the derivative of (4) with respect to time at CPA, and substituting in the relationship between bearing rate and range (1), the range at CPA can now be determined as

\[
R_{CPA} = -\frac{V_r^2}{c} f_0 \left( \frac{df_r}{dc} \right)_{CPA}
\]

Thus the doppler range may be calculated without requiring the tracking vessel to conduct a ranging manoeuvre as is the case with bearings-only tracking. For automated doppler-bearing algorithms, an ownship manoeuvre will serve to increase the quality of the target solution as well as increase in the number of frequencies tracked. In a similar fashion to the bearings-only algorithms, doppler-bearing filters have been recently proposed that make use of maximum likelihood batch processing.

**Development of the DBT System Equations**

The doppler-bearing equations will be developed here to show the inherent simplicity of the system and provide some insight to a typical algorithm. The difficulty with all passive tracking filters stems from the non-linear nature of the system equations. This has been overcome by making use of what is called the pseudo-linear formulation of the doppler-bearing problem. The non-linear estimation problem will be linearized by multiplying the target position and velocities by the source frequency.

The first equation of the doppler-bearing tracker is based upon the relationship between the receiver doppler-shifted frequency \( f^*_k \), the source frequency \( f_0 \), and the radial relative velocity \( V \cos \theta_k \), which is

\[
f^*_k = f_0 i (1 + \frac{V \cos \theta_k}{c} )
\]

where \( c \) is the speed of sound in water and \( \theta_k \) is the angle between the target velocity vector and the bearing line (Fig. 2). This equation can be expressed in terms of the x and y components of the target and ownship velocities, so that

\[
f^*_k = f_0 i \left[1 - \left( x_{tk} - x_{0k} \right) \frac{\cos \beta_k}{c} - \left( y_{tk} - y_{0k} \right) \frac{\sin \beta_k}{c} \right]
\]

where \( \beta_k \) is the bearing to the target measured from the positive x axis at time index \( k \). The received doppler-shifted frequency can now be written in terms of the target solution parameters as

\[
f^*_k = \left( f_0 \right) \left[1 + x_{0k} \frac{\cos \beta_k}{c} + y_{0k} \frac{\sin \beta_k}{c} \right] - \left( f^*_k \right) \left[ \frac{\cos \beta_k}{c} - \frac{\sin \beta_k}{c} \right]
\]

The second equation is based upon the relationship of the measured angle to the positions of the ownship and the target,

\[
\tan \beta_k = \frac{\sin \beta_k}{\cos \beta_k} = \frac{y_{tk} - y_{0k}}{x_{tk} - x_{0k}}
\]

Cross-multiplying (9) and multiplying through with \( f^*_k \) gives the final form of the second equation,

\[
0 = \left( f^*_k \right) \left( x_{tk} \frac{\sin \beta_k}{\cos \beta_k} - y_{0k} \frac{\cos \beta_k}{\cos \beta_k} \right) - \left( f^*_k \right) \left( x_{0k} \frac{\sin \beta_k}{\cos \beta_k} + y_{0k} \frac{\cos \beta_k}{\cos \beta_k} \right)
\]

Thus the doppler-bearing system can be described with two equations. As there are in this case five unknowns, at least five
measurements of bearing and doppler-shifted frequency will be needed to calculate the target solution. In practice there is noise in these measurements and hence many measurements are necessary for a good estimate. These two equations (8 and 10) form the heart of the automated, pseudo-linear doppler-bearing algorithm.

An Illustrative Example

To compare the performance of the bearings-only and doppler-bearing tracking methods, a typical passive tracking scenario was simulated using an automated estimation algorithm developed in [6]. As shown in Fig. 3, the tracking vessel commences the run (steering south at 16 knots) at a range of over 20 kilometres from the target which is steering north at 16 knots. Measurements are taken five seconds apart for a total of 180 discrete measurements over 15 minutes. After five minutes the tracking vessel alters course to the east. Measurement noise for bearings and frequency measurements were arbitrarily chosen as 1 degree and .3 Hz standard deviation respectively. The target was radiating a single 300-Hz tone.

Figure 3 shows the ownship and target tracks on a cartesian plot. The estimated target solution for both the bearings-only and the doppler-bearing filters, given identical bearing measurements, is shown for a single run. It is clear that the doppler-bearing method provides a much more accurate position estimate than bearings-only at a significantly earlier time. The statistic of root-mean-square percent range error for 30 runs is plotted against time in Fig. 4 for both the bearings-only and the doppler-bearing filters. The smooth lines are the Cramer-Rao lower bound which represents the minimum theoretical variance attainable. Note that the bearings-only tracker does not provide a solution until the manoeuvre at five minutes. After 10 minutes of tracking, the expected bearings-only range error is 35 percent while the doppler-bearing is 13 percent. At 20 kilometres, this represents an expected error of 7000 metres for the bearings-only tracker compared to only 2600 metres for the doppler-bearing tracker.

From this example it is clear that the doppler-bearing tracker provides considerable improvement over the bearings-only method. In general this is always the case when sufficient doppler is present in the measurements. A scenario where the doppler-bearing tracker would perform only as well as a bearings-only tracker is that of a radially moving target (for example a stern chase) where there is negligible doppler-shift in the frequency measurements.

Conclusions

By measuring both target bearing and radiated frequencies a target may be successfully tracked without the need for an ownship ranging manoeuvre. Doppler-bearing tracking can provide high-quality target solutions that are more accurate than those previously possible using the more traditional bearings-only techniques, and in significantly less time. Furthermore, the doppler-bearing tracker provides the operator with an optimal estimate of the target's radiated source frequency or frequencies. This new approach promises to become an effective signal processing tool in the ongoing problem of underwater passive tracking and shows potential for application with such diverse sensors as towed arrays and sonobuoys.

References


Greenspace: Maritime Environmental Protection

Asbestos elimination: Testing asbestos-free gasket and packing materials

By Nabil Shehata

Concern over the health hazards associated with the use of asbestos fibre has created an interest in finding substitutes for asbestos-based gasket and packing materials. Under the direction of the Directorate of Ship Engineering (DSE 6), the Naval Engineering Test Establishment (NETE) in LaSalle, Quebec is testing a variety of asbestos-free materials for shipboard applications.

Materials slated for steam service are being subjected to a 1,000-hour superheated steam endurance test, followed by a high-impact shock test and another 100 hours of steam exposure. Similar tests, using hot air as the test medium, are conducted on asbestos-free materials intended for low-pressure air service.

To date, NETE has completed two test runs on materials slated for steam service, and a test run on materials intended for air service. Among the many materials tested for steam service, flexible graphite appears to be the most promising. The shock test shed light on the previously unknown behaviour of this material under shock loads. The data generated from the tests is being shared with other NATO member navies through an official information exchange program.

Nabil Shehata is a project engineer for asbestos elimination at the Naval Engineering Test Establishment.
This year’s Eastern Region Maritime Engineering Seminar, held at the Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax, March 31 to April 1, drew record numbers of naval and civilian engineering personnel. The theme, “Fleet Support: New Challenges, New Thinking,” was supported both by formal presentations and by a series of think-tanks focusing on MARE training, resource management initiatives and ship signature management. Cmdre David Faulkner (COS MAT) welcomed the assembly, stressing that the occasion was designed to be a professional opportunity to learn, contribute and enjoy.

In his opening remarks, Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, RAdm Lynn Mason cautioned that, while our new frigates were conceived in the Cold War, the radical political changes the world has experienced over the past few years have not necessarily made for a situation any less threatening to global stability. As a maritime nation, he said, Canada will need the capabilities manifest in its new fleet. Cdr Carl Doucette (on behalf of DCOS Plans and Operations) later explored the navy’s operational future, reviewing defence policy objectives and the likely nature of naval missions in light of current and potential budget cuts.

The MARE Branch Adviser, Cmdre Robert L. Preston (DGMEM), outlined the status of the navy’s engineering resources, including personnel, organization and equipment — all of which he considered to be in good health. He cautioned, though, that the process by which priorities are set and work is executed requires attention. In an open forum later, he and sub-MOC advisers Capt(N) David Riis (DMEE), Capt(N) Yvon DeBlois (DMCS) and Capt(N) Peter Child (DSE) joined a panel including Cmdre Faulkner and MARE career managers LCdr Bob Chenier and Lt(N) Spencer Collins to discuss MARE personnel concerns.

The formal presentations covered a broad range of topics and were extremely well received. Seminar chairman Capt(N) David Marshall, CO NEUA, spoke of various resource management initiatives designed to improve the quality of engineering services being provided to the fleet. He described how the impact of a salary-wage-envelope (SWE) operating budget and total quality leadership concepts were intimately associated with NEUA’s strategic business plan.

HMCS Iroquois engineers LCdr Gerry MacLean (CSEO) and LCdr Ernie Nash (MSEO) related their experiences of the past year in bringing their ship to its current operational status. Despite the many engineering difficulties still to be put right, they spoke with obvious pride about a ship that represents an unprecedented leap in Canadian warship capability. Lt(N) Paul Shaw’s excellent presentation on ship signature management — one of the major topics of the two days — provided a good preamble to the syndicate discussion that followed. equally impressive was a series of short, frank presentations made by six junior MAREs serving in their first working tours.

With respect to NCM developments, LCdr John Bottomley reported on the findings and recommendations of the Naval Electronic Technician Occupation Restructuring Project. Bottomley, the NETORP project leader, reported that while divisional briefings will address the issues this fall, it is clear that changes to training, establishment and management are needed to address the difficulties being experienced by the affected NET MOCs.

NDHQ perspectives got good representation from a number of speakers. DGMEM LCMM staff Ron Lajoie and Steve Lamirande discussed the provision of in-service support technical data packages currently making their way into the fleet and its various support agencies. They pointed out that much work has yet to be done to satisfy the full mandate of this prodigious undertaking. DMEE 4 LCMM representative Réal Thibault made a strong case for adopting certain progressive ADP database management measures to improve life-cycle support for the new fleet. On a lighter note, DMEE 6 engineer LCdr Mike Adams regaled the audience with his novel “synergistic” approach to increasing the probability of finding effective solutions to otherwise intractable problems.

That the challenges the navy faces are not unique unto itself was made very clear by keynote speaker Capt(N) (Ret.) Bruce Baxter. Baxter, vice-president of naval programs for Paramax Electronics Ltd., provided the audience with his view as to where defence-related civilian industry stands with respect to its perceived future. Dramatic changes are pending, he said, and
aggressive innovation will be needed to compete successfully in a shrinking marketplace.

Dr. William Tolles, associate director of research at the Naval Research Laboratories in Washington, DC, completed the list of formal seminar speakers. Ribbed as being the technical mole for Tom Clancy’s techno-thrillers, Tolles provided a fascinating insight to the world of emerging technology that defence agencies might wish to explore.

Cmdre Faulkner closed the proceedings by congratulating the people responsible for bringing CPF and TRUMP to reality. He emphasized the need for strong leadership within the MARE community to provide direction and definition in the transition process leading to the efficient support of our new fleet.

All told, the objectives of the seminar were met. The event was an unqualified, professionally refreshing success.

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**Looking Back**

**HMS Captain — A disaster from the past**

What went wrong? This combined sail and steam battleship weathered storms during her acceptance trials in 1870 only to be blown down in a gale months later with calamitous results.

By LCdr Derek W. Davis

When she was completed in January 1870 the RN battleship HMS Captain had the dubious distinction of having the least range of stability of any ship in the British fleet. Before the year was out she would take most of her crew to a watery grave. With hindsight the calamity can be seen as a result of complicated shipbuilding contractual arrangements, lack of trust in admiralty designers and an inadequate understanding of stability.

HMS Captain was built as a direct result of intense public attacks on the admiralty, in particular on its design department, by one of the original inventors and advocates of the gun turret system, Captain Cowper Coles. As a Royal Navy officer on half pay during the early 1860s, Coles repeatedly criticized the admiralty for not building enough ocean-going, turret-equipped warships. With hindsight the calamity can be seen as a result of complicated shipbuilding contractual arrangements, lack of trust in admiralty designers and an inadequate understanding of stability.

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When she was completed in January 1870 the RN battleship HMS Captain had the dubious distinction of having the least range of stability of any ship in the British fleet. Before the year was out she would take most of her crew to a watery grave. With hindsight the calamity can be seen as a result of complicated shipbuilding contractual arrangements, lack of trust in admiralty designers and an inadequate understanding of stability.
the contrary, as the ship was fitted out and a hundred extra crew were added, things got even worse. By the summer of 1870 Captain's freeboard was down to 6 feet 7 inches.

The effect of the overweightedness and low freeboard was amply demonstrated during the ship's inclining experiment in July 1870. Calculations showed that the ship's deck edge would go under at 14 degrees of heel. The maximum righting moment occurred at 21 degrees, while the angle of vanishing stability (the point beyond which the ship could not recover) would occur at 54 1/2 degrees. Overall, the range of stability was less than that for any other ship in the Royal Navy. (Present-day studies show that these figures were optimistic and made no allowance for dynamic effects such as wind.) Despite Captain's overweighted design and poor stability, the ship was deemed safe as long as prudence were used in sailing her, especially since she had already weathered rough conditions on her acceptance cruises. The ship successfully completed her sea trials, final payment was made to the shipbuilder and the battleship was accepted into service by the Royal Navy.

On Sept. 6, 1870, HMS Captain was at sea with the Mediterranean Fleet when Admiral Milne boarded her for an inspection. He was surprised by the curious "sensation of stepping out of his cutter directly onto a warship's upper deck." The admiral stated his concern over the ship's sailing qualities and low freeboard, but did not press the point with Captain Coles (who was on board as a privileged observer). After completing his inspection he returned to his flagship, just as the weather began to turn dirty.

Shortly after midnight, with a moderate gale blowing, the ship appeared to be hit by a heavy gust. The captain desperately tried to reduce sail by ordering the topsail halyards cut, but before this could be done the ship heeled over and sank. The ship took 472 men with her, including Captain Coles and the son of Mr. Hugh Childers, First Lord of the Admiralty. (Childers had appointed his son to the ship "as a measure of appreciation of her novel fighting qualities in opposition to the Chief Constructor's views." There were only 18 survivors.

The subsequent admiralty investigation concluded that the ship was probably lost as a result of poor stability, close sailing and an overly heavy sailing rig. The other lessons which took longer to learn were those of the need for professional, rather than amateur ship designers; the need for weight control, including inclining experiments; and the need for a proper understanding of stability. The Captain incident in particular led to the beginning of what have now evolved into present-day intact stability standards.

References
Diving tender replacement

There is good news for the fleet diving units. The Directorate of Naval Requirements (DNR) and the Directorate of Maritime Engineering Support are now in the development phase of a new-vessel project to replace the navy’s five diving tenders which have been in service for more than 30 years. The new tenders, which will be designed and built to commercial standards, are expected to be in operation by 1999.

The timing couldn’t be better. The original life-expectancy of the tenders now operating with the FDUs should have seen them being phased out this year and next. As it is, the navy will have to coax them along until the replacements are available.

According to tender replacement Project Director LCdr Henry Mark, staff officer for diving and EOD in DNR, the three wooden-hulled vessels, built between 1955 and 1958, and two steel-hulled tenders built in 1962 cannot be economically maintained beyond 2000. “The vessels are getting so old and so decrepit and so hard to maintain — they’re spending five months in refit (every two years),” he said.

Mark produced a document that described the state of one of the wooden-hull tenders as alarming. Broken main beams in the engine-room have allowed the main deck to sag under the centre of the superstructure by several inches. The steel-hulls have their own problems. During a refit late last year one tender had to have 130 square feet of severely corroded plating replaced.

The limited capability of these small, 85- and 135-tonne vessels in modern diving operations has been apparent for some time. The new twin-screw tenders, at approximately 30 metres in length with a displacement of 250-300 tonnes, will offer a vast improvement in capability, seakeeping and endurance. No decision has been made on the number of new vessels that will be built.

Designed for shallow-water diving operations, the new tenders will be capable of supporting underwater search and salvage operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and a broad range of underwater inspections and maintenance. At a cruising speed of 10 knots they will have a range of 1200 nautical miles, and carry enough stores to sustain their mixed-gender crews of 17 for up to two weeks.

Specialized equipment for the tenders will include a recompression chamber, side-scan sonar, HP air compressors, a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) and a...
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three-tonne deck crane. By all accounts navy clearance divers will be getting the main features they want in a tender. “They’re looking for mobility, a recompression chamber on the main deck and an effective mooring capability,” Mark said.

The diving tender replacement project goes to program development proposal (PDP), an in-house option-selection process, in August 1994. One option the navy will be considering seriously involves building upon the hull design and machinery arrangement of the torpedo and ship ranging vessel (TSRV) delivered to the navy in 1991 (MEJ: January 1992, page 25). “We’re going on the assumption that the TSRV option will be our best bet at this stage,” Mark said. — with files from LcDr Mark Read and Lt(N) Bill Haydock, DMES 3.

Datatrap for CPF

Procurement is now under way for a CPF-version of the Datatrap 9000N automated machinery condition data collection system already fitted in major Canadian fleet units. The Datatrap, manufactured by Beta Monitors and Controls Ltd. of Calgary, is the latest development in shipboard machinery condition monitoring using vibration analysis. The CPF version will feature a greater VdB range tailored to meet the needs of inherently quieter ships.

The major advantages of using the Datatrap for condition monitoring are significantly increased machinery availability and reduced ship maintenance costs. Thanks to the Datatrap's simple PC-based operation, shipboard and shore-based technical staffs will have an easier time diagnosing machinery problems and looking for system-wide improvements. At the moment, Datatraps and their associated shore infrastructure are in place for all submarines and major ship classes except CPF. Datatraps for both the Halifax and Iroquois classes will eventually be interfaced with ICEMaN — the navy’s Integrated Configuration and Engineering Maintenance Network.

Technical investigation and acceptance testing for the Datatrap were conducted at the Naval Engineering Test Establishment in LaSalle, Quebec in conjunction with DMEE 7 and DSE 6.

Portugal: AN/SQS-510 sonar acceptance trials

DMCS 3 personnel travelled to Portugal in March to conduct final acceptance trials of the AN/SQS-510 sonar on board the Portuguese frigate NRP Vasco da Gama. The trials were conducted under the auspices of a 1980 NATO project to provide military assistance to Portugal (MEJ: April 1987, page 30). Under the project Canada is supplying three complete AN/SQS-510 sonar suites for Portugal’s new Vasco da Gama-class frigates. Final acceptance trials in NRP Alaves Cabral were completed last December, and the last will be conducted in Corte Real this fall. Successful completion of the trials will mark the end of the project.

The recent acceptance trials comprised two days of alongside testing of the interface between the AN/SQS-510 sonar and the STACOS Command and Control System, and one day of sea acceptance trials against a submarine target off Lisbon. Final delivery, installation and set-to-work of the sonar equipment for the three ships were completed in the spring of 1991, with the final software development being completed last November. The ships have been operating pre-production software in the interim.

The AN/SQS-510 sonar is manufactured by Computing Devices Canada of Nepean, Ontario and is currently in service in a hull-mounted configuration in HMCS Nipigon, and fitted in a VDS configuration in Terra Nova. The 510 sonar is also being considered for retrofit in the Halifax- and Iroquois-class ships. The Portuguese navy is procuring five additional sets, one for a shore-based trainer and four for installation in their Joao Belo-class frigates.
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45 years of service!

Mk 12 IFF project manager John Joe Reilly (centre left) and radar systems engineer David Castleman (c-r), both from DMCS 4, were awarded 45-year service medallions in February by Sr ADM(Mat), R.N. Sturgeon (left); with Cmdre Robert L. Preston, DGMEM.

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**Kuwait Liberation Medal**

In January Cmrdre David Faulkner, Chief of Staff Materiel in Maritime Command, presented the Kuwait Liberation Medal to CPO2 Robert Bussières and Lt(N) David Coulter of the Materiel branch technical readiness section. Both had served in HMCS Terra Nova during Operation Friction — Coulter as MSEO, Bussières as the engineering Chief Regulating PO. The medals were a gift of the government of Saudi Arabia to mark the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.
**1992 MARE awards**

Bravo Zulus go out to the recipients of the 1992 MARE awards. On the Marine Systems side of the house, Lt(N) Al Cook picked up the Peacock Award for graduating with the best overall aggregate marks from the start of his MARE 44B training. SLt Mike Bonnah received the CAE Award as top academic student in the MARE 44B applications course shore phase.

On the Combat Systems side, Lt(N) Martin Torn won the Paramax Award for top CSE officer achieving MARE 44C qualification in 1992, and SLt Bruce Martin received the Westinghouse Award for professional excellence in CSE training.

Congratulations to the winners and finalists.

Robert Dufault of Westinghouse presents the 1992 Westinghouse Award to SLt Bruce Martin.

**CSE Awards**

Paramax’s Capt(N) (Ret.) Bruce Baxter (inset) presents a naval sword to 1992 Paramax Award winner Lt(N) Martin Torn. Earlier, the five award finalists had posed for a photo with the senior MAREs who made up the award’s selection board: (L to R) SLt Langlois, Cdr Ralph, Lt(N) Prokopiw, Lt(N) Hardy, Capt(N) DeBlois (chairman), Cdr McVicar, Cdr Wilson, Cdr Tremblay, Lt(N) Holbourn and 1992 winner Lt(N) Torn. Board member Cdr Eldridge is absent.
MSE Awards

Brian Emo, president of Peacock Bros. Ltd. presents a naval sword to 1992 Peacock Award winner Lt(N) Al Cook.

CAE senior marketing manager Wendy Allerton presents the CAE Award to 1992 winner SLt Mike Bonnah.
**Naval reserve MAREs**

Regular force Maritime Engineers thinking about retirement might want to take a close look at the naval reserve. The reserves are once again recruiting MARE(R) officers, this time to fill an approved establishment of 90 positions by 2002. The current MARE(R) strength is 34 officers, with 10 new positions opening this fiscal year.

The uncertainty that has plagued the reserve MARE program was dispelled in April when the Naval Personnel Working Group sanctioned specific roles proposed by Naval Reserve Headquarters. MARE(R)s will be employed primarily as engineering department heads in naval reserve divisions, responsible for such things as ADP management, environmental activities and safety, and in technical support functions with the Maritime Coastal Defence organization. During periods of national mobilization MARE(R)s will augment staffs in the navy's shore technical units.

The naval reserve is expected to take delivery of 12 new maritime coastal defence vessels by 1999. The approval of the newly defined MARE(R) roles was an essential step in preparing for the Total Force MARE occupational analysis, scheduled to begin in August, and the subsequent production of integrated occupation specifications.

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**Canadian Naval Historical Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, October 8-9, 1993**

Maritime Command is hosting its second Canadian Naval Historical Conference at the Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax this fall. Twelve papers supporting the theme “In Quest of a Canadian Naval Identity” will be presented at the conference and produced in a commercial publication. The objective is to examine the social history of the Canadian navy and its evolution as a national institution.

For this year’s conference, three papers will be presented on each of the following study areas: Roots of the RCN (1867 to 1914); Global Wars (1914 to 1950s); the Era of Violent Peace (1950s to 1990); and the Navy Today and the Next 40 Years. The aim of the Canadian Naval Historical Conference, as it was established in 1990, is to encourage serving members and young scholars of naval affairs to examine the historical and contemporary record and write papers.

**10th Ship Control Systems Symposium, Ottawa, Ontario, October 25-29, 1993**

The 10th edition of the Ship Control Systems Symposium, a triennial international event, is being sponsored this year by the Canadian Department of National Defence. The theme of the 10th symposium is: “Application of Modern Ship Control Technology in the 1990s and Beyond.” As new developments continue to emerge in ship automation and control, the symposium permits those who are involved with ship control systems to meet in a professional atmosphere to exchange useful, technical information.

Additional details may be obtained by contacting: Lt(N) C. Zaidi, Coordinator, 10th Ship Control Systems Symposium, DGMEM/DMEE 7 (3 LSTL), 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2; Tel: (819) 997-2493; Fax: (819) 994-9929.
Adventures in Black Water

Coming up in our next issue